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. Thought on Revelation in the 

World Religions 

On the one hand, Paul Tillich argued for the decisiveness, indeed, the 
finality of God's revelation in Jesus Christ. On the other hand, Tillich held that 
the ultimate is revealed in every culture, every major world religion, often in ways 
that can enlighten Christian's engaged in interreligious dialogue. To put it 
humorously, Tillich might be labeled the "prince of polarities" or the "duke of 
dialectics." In this paper I will explore the above polarity and apparent tension of 
Christocentric finality versus openness to revelation from other world religions. 
In so doing I will utilize other Tillichian polaritie's, especially preparatory -- final 
revelation and absolute universality -- concrete particularity. 
In "The Reality of Revelation" in Volume 1 of the Systematic Theology, 
Tillich offers some strong words about the decisiveness of final revelation in Jesus 
as the Christ: "Final revelation means the decisive, fulfilling, unsurpassable 
revelation, that which is the criterion of all the others" (133). In general a final 
revelation for a believer is Ucritical with respect to other revelations" (117). For 
the believer in a final revelation, any other revelations are subsumed under the 
category of upreparatory" for Tillich. One can believe in only one final revelation 
at a given time. Other revelations can prepare one to accept the final revelation, 
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but any other revelation must always be evaluated in light of the unsurpassibility 
of the final revelation. Indeed, "the Christian Church has lost its foundation," if 
another point of reference besides Jesus Christ is "sought or accepted" (132-33). 
Moreover, Jesus as the Christ, insofar as it is final revelation, is universally valid 
(1:107,137; 2:151). 
It has been said, "what theologians give you with the right hand, they take 
back with the left." Though Tillich writes strong words about the absoluteness of 
final revelation, we dare not forget Tillich's famous Protestant Principle. If final 
revelation is critical of other revelations, there is !llso a sense for Tillich in which a 
genuine final revelation must be critical of itself as well. A proper religious 
symbol should point to the absolute but not absolutize itself, represent the ultimate 
but not identify itselfwith the ultimate. A revelation can be universal only as it 
negates its finite particularity. For Tillich Jesus as the Christ is final revelation 
only as he surrenders or negates himself as a particular finite individual. As 
Tillich puts it in Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religion: 
It is a personal life, the image of which, as it impressed itself on his 
followers, shows no break in his relation to God and no claim for himself in 
his particularity. What is particular in him is that he crucified the particular 
in himself for the sake of the universal ..... With this image, particular yet 
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free from particularity, religious yet free from religion, the criteria are given 
under which Christianity must judge itself and, by judging itself, judge also 
the other religions and quasi-religions (81-82). 
Similar to a symbol, a religion is genuinely revelatory only as it negates 
itself as a particular religion. In the Systematic, Tillich pens: 
The unconditional and universal claim of Christianity is not based on 
its superiority over other religions. Christianity, without being final itself, 
witnesses to the final revelation. Christianity as Christianity is neither final 
nor universal. But that to which it witnesses is final and universal. (l: 134) 
More generally, more simply, and more bluntly, Tillich declares in 
Encounter, " ... a particular religion will be lasting to the degree in which it negates 
itself as a religion. Thus Christianity will be a bearer of a religious answer as long 
as it breaks through its own particularity" (97). 
Clearly for Tillich the revelatory effectiveness of a symbol or religion banks 
upon the relationship between particularity and universality. Regarding the 
tension between concreteness and universality in general, Tillich indicates in the 
Systematic that it can be reduced in one of two ways: 1) finding a common 
denominator among examples, which results in abstraction and empty generality 
or 2) uniting absolute concreteness and absolute universality which results in, 
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indeed is, final revelation (1: 107). In Encounter Tillich inveighs against religion 
as abstraction: that none of the typological polar elements "are ever completely 
lacking in any genuine experience of the holy ... does not mean that a fusion of the 
Christian and the Buddhist idea of God is possible, nor does it mean that one can 
produce a common denominator by depriving symbols of their concreteness" 
(67). 
We have seen that Tillich believes his understanding of Jesus as the Christ 
preserves particularity, while at the same time negating particularity insofar as it 
would claim any ultimacy for itself as finite and particular. Does Tillich pull it 
off? In an age that many call "postmodem/' particularity is demanding its due 
more loudly than in Tillich's day. When Tillich characterizes the bearer of final 
revelation as sacrificing its finituide, he indicates that it must possess itself 
completely and possess "unity with the ground of his being and meaning without 
separation and disruption" (1: 133). Furthermore, Tillich indicates that Jesus' 
individuality is always expressed with his universal significance (2: 151). Thus, 
Tillich is not suggesting that said bearer lose its personality in a mystical 
absorption or undifferentiation. (Even in sacrificing his life, the personal element 
of Jesus is not lost in Eternal Life in Tillich's scheme.) Yet I admit I am somewhat 
uncomfortable with Tillich's rendering of his solution. To speak of Jesus' 
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Christhood as consisting primarily of his refusal to claim ultimacy himself, 
epitomized in his willingness to be crucified, is an abstraction that understates the 
constellation of historical particularities that enabled Jesus' life and death to 
become revelatory. After all, various martyrs have sacrificed their lives for the 
sake of the ultimate without claiming ultimacy for themselves. Though Tillich 
acknowledges in theory Jesus' continuity with a particular historical community as 
a necessary dimension of his reception as the Christ (2:117; see also, 1966:84-85), 
Tillich's Christology is more a modem Alexandrian than an Antiochian one. It is a 
via negativa rather than a positive way of describing how particularity/ 
particularities can be revelatory. 
In addition, when Tillich talks of typological polar elements (personal­
transpersonal, mystical-ethical and their off shoots) as configured in a special way 
in any living religion, he may again undervalue concrete particularity: "Therefore, 
the decisive point in a dialogue between two religions is not the historically 
determined, contingent embodiment [ emphasis his] of the typological elements, 
but these elements themselves" (1963: 57). 
Yet, while Tillich may not grant the concrete its adequate due for my and 
other's "postmodem" sensibilities, I agree with Tillich that there are common 
structural elements in the universe, human experience, and human experience of 
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the holy (1963 :57). The concrete can reveal truth about the universal and 
ultimate. That there are various typological polar elements to be discerned in 
particular configurations in different world religions is still a valid and fruitful 
idea. And Tillich is correctly historicist in noting that such configurations within 
Christianity or any living religion vary in different historical periods (1963:56). 
The foregoing discussion brings us to the question of how accurate and fair 
are Tillich's typological analyses of various world religions. In brief, I judge that 
Tillich did succumb to certain stereotypes common to his time, not giving full 
justice to the complex particularities ofnon-Christian religions and their various 
strands. Of course, Tillich does somewhat cover himself with the general 
declamation that none of the polar elements is ever completely lacking in any 
living religion. Yet his generalizing about non-Christian religions often leaves us 
no particular sense of how a non-dominant element is in fact present at all. Thus, I 
sense a need to critique, update, and expand Tillich's analyses based on the 
increased knowledge of world religions available today. 
Tillich characterizes Hinduism only in passing, as a "radical asceticism," 
which has grown out of a basic attitude that ultimate fulfillment comes from 
salvation from reality (1963:73). Now it is true that liberation from samsara is the 
ultimate goal in the advaita and bhaki strands, though not of rural folk Hinduism. 
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But even in those strands'there are strong countervailing tendencies. In continuity 
with its primal and archaic roots, as well as consistent with what Tillich calls its 
emphasis on the typological element of identity with nature (1963 :69), many have 
noted Hinduism's biological flavor. Even its vaunted asceticism is complex and 
paradoxical: asceticism in the Hindu tradition is often a means to preserve and 
enhance power for creative purposes (including sexual ones). 
Ofthe non-Christian religions, Tillich of course had a special interest in 
Buddhism. Chapter 3 of Encounter is entitled, "A Christian-Buddhist 
Conversation. ll Yet Tillich is influenced by stereotypes here, too. He is aware of a 
difference in attitude toward nature and the world in Theravada versus Mahayana 
Buddhism (70). Nevertheless, he generalizes that in Buddhism, as in Hinduism, 
"salvation from reality is the basic attitude ll (73). I do agree that such is the basic 
attitude in Theravada historically. But Nagarjuna's Mahayana dictum that 
'Samsara is Nirvana" and "Nirvana is Samsara ll can hardly be squared with such a 
world-denying characterization. Tillich also opines that, in contrast to Christianity 
(and other Western religions), for "Buddhism the fact that there is a world is the 
result of an ontological Fall into finitude" (65). That is true about Theravada's 
interpretation of codependent origin: desire (tanha) is the driving force behind 
samsara. But in Mahayana, Nirvana, sunyata, or the Buddha-nature is commonly 
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understood to be the formless source of all forms. Then codependency and 
interconnectedness become not an impetus for "ultimate detachment" as Tillich 
puts it (73), but for relative detachment and proper attachment: one is freed from 
selfish attachment to one's own (imagined) separate self and freed for compassion 
for all. In the Mahayana vision, particulars do not lose their reality or value -­
rather how we perceive them is transformed. Tillich further indicates that 
Buddhist compassion, stemming from the pole of identity, lacks the will to 
transform (71-73). Yet the purpose of the Boddhisattva is precisely to transform, 
to help enlighten others, to enable them to change their perspective on the 
universe. Buddhist compassion could open to the will to transform society. True, 
one struggles to find historical examples besides Buddhism's rejection of the caste 
system and King Asoka's reign. But then one strains to find historical examples of 
Christian agape attempting to fundamentally transform society before the modern 
period. 
Finally, in Tillich's analyses of non-Christian religions, Islam get short-
shrift as a simplified religion attractive to primitives (1963:22,37,87).* While 
• 	 On a more positive note, Tillich indicates in his final speech, that Islam's lack 
of emphasis on sin taken in conjunction with the Christian emphasis on it "can 
enlarge our understanding of man." (1966:93-94). 
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Tillich does note that Islam "absorb( ed) large elements of the ancient culture" (37), 
one gets no sense of the complexity and richness of Islamic philosophy and 
theology and of Sufi mysticism. While Tillich was and is correct that Islam has 
not taken on a self-critical attitude analogous to the segments of Christianity 
influenced by the Enlightenment (1963 :95), there are in Muslim philosophy, 
theology, and mysticism both examples of and resources for self-criticism, as well 
as a contemporary growing minority interested in interreligious dialogue. 
Before leaving Islam, I will comment on Tillich's claim that Christianity 
became radically exclusivistic as a result of its en~ounter with and need to defend 
itself against Islam (1963:37-39). Of course, sweeping generalizations with 
minimal citation of specific evidence are part of what endears us to Tillich's 
prodigious mind. And I am no expert on the relevant medieval history. But as an 
amateur I would ask two questions: 1) Was Islam any significant threat to 
Christian Western Europe following Charles Martel's victory in 732? 2) If not, 
don't we need other explanations for a supposedly growing exclusivism that 
culminated in the Crusades (which became politically and militarily feasible only 
with the rise of nation states)? 
While Tillich attempts to explain and perhaps excuse the history of 
Christian exclusivism with respect to other world religions, he notes and is clearly 
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sympathetic with the more universalistic and inclusivistic facets of Christian 
history. He cites the patristic notion of the universal Logos present in all cultures ­
- providing "preparatory revelationll in the terminology of the Systematic (1 :34fO 
and chides Barth and his followers for abandoning this universalistic Logos 
tradition ( 1963 :46). 
Yet in terms of John Hick's now familiar exclusivism - inclusivism ­
pluralism triumvirate, the openness of this Logos tradition was at best inclusivism 
and at worst a kinder and gentler exclusivism. But I will argue that Tillich is best 
understood as a pluralist, both on the basis of the logic of his system and of 
explicit remarks regarding Christianity's proper relationship to other world 
religions. 
First of all, I will consider the logic ofTillich's dialectical understanding of 
final revelation. Crucial for Tillich is that neither Christianity nor any other 
religion is ever final nor even superior in itself -- it can only witness to the final 
revelation (Systematic Theology: 1: 134-35). Furthermore, the revelation of Jesus 
as the Christ in not claiming absoluteness for itself does not claim finality in itself 
-- it is final only insofar as it points to or witnesses to the absolute. As Tillich 
indicates, the Christian believer is not looking for, is not existentially open to, a 
supercessionary revelation; for the believer has found final revelation in Jesus 
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Christ. On the other hand, Tillich's system is totally permissive of the possibility 
that another believer from another religious tradition has found a different final 
revelation. The fundamental criterion -- foregoing the claim to absoluteness for 
itself while pointing to the absolute -- is an inherently pluralistic one. In "The 
Reality of the Christ," Tillich addresses the -- for him -- real possibility that future 
human beings might be cut off from the historical tradition in which Jesus 
appeared as the Christ (2: 100). For Tillich, there are different historical traditions 
in which in theory final revelation may appear. 
One might ask ifTillich's final lecture, printed in The Future of Religions, 
calls into question my above characterization of Tillich's system. In it, Tillich 
uses the term "Religion of the Concrete Spirit" to refer to a religious moment 
where the mystical and ethical poles are united in a sacramental manifestation of 
the Holy (1966:86-87). This may be understood as another way of describing 
final revelation. Of course, for Christians the "appearance of Jesus as the Christ" 
is "the decisive victory in this struggle" of the polar elements to find a united 
expression (1966:88). Yet here again Tillich opines that the Religion of the 
Concrete cannot be identified with any actual religion, even Christianity 
(1966:87). Indeed, it is realized only fragmentarily in Christian history (1966:88­
89). At the same time, Religion of the Concrete Spirit happens fragmentarily in 
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other religions "not historicall y or empirically connected with the [event of the] 
cross" (1966:89). 
At the beginning of this lecture, Tillich states an assumption that could 
imply that one manifestation of Religion of the Concrete Spirit could have an 
objective superiority to all others: 
there may be -- and I stress this, there may be -- a central event in the 
history of religions which unites the results of these critical developments in 
the history of religion in and under which revelatory experiences are going 
on -- event which, therefore, makes possible a concrete theology that has 
universal significance (1966:81). 
Since Tillich clearly believes that final revelation has happened for Christians, I 
would interpret this remark to raise the possibility that all major world religions 
might someday regard one particular event as final revelation (from Tillich's 
perspective this event would hopefully be Jesus as the Christ). Under Tillich's 
scheme, this would entail that each of the world religions would come to regard 
this central event as the fulfillment of revelation in their own historical tradition; 
preceding revelation would then be regarded as preparatory. On the face of it, 
such a happening seems quite unlikely. This would explain Tillich's stress on the 
hypothetical nature of the possibility. Though Tillich's final speech uses some 
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new terminology in somewhat opaque fashion, if my interpretations are correct, it 
ultimately does not violate the pluralistic logic of his system. 
When Tillich ventures his opinion on the proper relationship of Christianity 
to other world religions, he reveals a stance appropriate to a pluralist. He opposes 
attempts to convert, denying (again) that Christianity is an inherently or decisively 
superior religion (1963 :56-57, 94-95). Rather, every world religion manifests the 
various typological elements in shifting configurations as each attempts to 
negotiate a proper balance for its cultural and historical context. The proper 
relationship is thus one of dialogue (95). Even a~ a religion dialogues within its 
own tradition in attempting to give proper due to all of the elements, it should also 
dialogue with other world religions for the same purpose. One might ask about 
the apparent discrepancy between other revelations as "preparatory" versus as 
dialogue partners for negotiating the typological elements. In my judgment, the 
difference is one of context. "Preparatory" revelation is appropriate before one has 
received final revelation; dialogical revelation is appropriate after reception of 
final revelation. 
Paul Tillich's Protestant Principle, in denying the absoluteness superiority, 
or finality of any revelation in itself and in advocating the necessity for any 
religion to dynamically negotiate the typological elements, drives him to a 
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pluralist position. A tension in Tillich's thought on revelation in the world 
religions remains. But the tension has to do with whether in actuality there have 
been final revelations in other world religions besides Christianity. Given Tillich's 
negative evaluations of various aspects of many non-Christian religions (the 
validity of which I have challenged), his answer may be "no," despite his position 
that each major world religion contains saving revelation and fragmentary 
manifestations of Religions of the Concrete Spirit. But in principle Tillich's 
system allows for multiple final revelations. And in principle and in power the 
apparent tension between the finality of revelatioJ:? in Jesus Christ and openness to 
other revelation dissolves-- or at least the tension is a friendly rather than a 
problematic one for Tillich. At the end ofEncounter, Tillich sermonizes: 
In the depth of every living religion there is a point at which the religion 
itself loses its importance, and that to which it points breaks through its 
particularly elevating it to spiritual freedom and with it to a vision of the 
spiritual presence in other expressions of the ultimate meaning of man's 
existence. (97) 
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